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THE PROBLEM OF LAW AND
MORALS IN CONTEMPORARY
JURISPRUDENCE t
MARK R. MACGUIGAN*

P ERHAPS THE MOST STRIKING characteristic of the common law is the
tension between its two conflicting attitudes to legal generalizations:
on the one hand, there is the cautious case by case approach, which in
tendency limits the generalization to the instant case; and on the other
hand, there is the attitude towards precedent expressed in the doctrine of
stare decisis, the principal of following the decided cases of the past,
which in tendency extends the generalization over a wide area of the law.
The interplay of these opposing tendencies makes possible a legal system
capable of both stability and change. Possibly the common law appears
to the nonlegal observer to be as changeless as the laws of the Medes
and Persians, and perhaps he feels that the only release from its rigid
embrace is to be found in statutory enactment, but anything more than
a cursory study will show that the common law of today is far from
a carbon copy of the common law of the nineteenth century. The law
changes as society changes, in some fields so rapidly that it has been
calculated that the life span of a case is about a single generation. We
cannot, therefore, assume without enquiry that the law's answer to
a particular question will be the same in every century.
The Relationship of Law And Morals
With regard to the problem of the relationship of law and morals
there is a distinctively nineteenth-century view, just as there was a distinctively medieval view-and possibly distinctive seventeenth and eighteenth-century views. The characteristically nineteenth-century attitude
was set forth-and indeed to a large extent formed-by the English
thinker John Austin. Austin was a strong proponent of the separation
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of law and morals, and expressed himself
on the subject as follows:
The existence of law is one thing; its merit
or demerit is another ....
A law, which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to
dislike it, or though it vary from the text,
by which we regulate our approbation and
disapprobation. This truth.., is so simple
and glaring that it seems idle to insist
upon it. . . . [T]o say that human laws
which conflict with the Divine law are not
binding, that is to say, are not laws, is to
talk stark nonsense. The most pernicious
laws, and therefore those which are most
opposed to the will of God, have been and
are continually enforced as laws by judicial
tribunals. . . . An exception, demurrer, or
plea, founded on the law of God was never
heard in a Court of Justice, from the creation of the world down to the present moment. 1
These are strong words, which reveal a
position emotionally as well as intellectually
held. The premise from which Austin derived his conclusions as to law and morals
was his belief that law was the command
of the sovereign and nothing more; naturally if law is the pure wilfulness of the
sovereign, it cannot be subject to any extrinsic standard, and so Austin excluded
from the law not only what he called the
law of God (by which he meant the realm
of natural or intrinsic morality) but also
what he called positive morality-notions
of decency and fair play, laws of honor,
commonly-held beliefs and prejudices, popular views as to the moral standards that
should prevail. For the most part I shall
use the words "morals" and "morality" (between which I make no distinction) in this
broad sense, as including any conceivable
extra-legal standard for judging human action.
1 AUSTIN,
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The Holmesian Concept
The twentieth-century attitude to the
problem of law and morals, which is our
concern, is by no means to be simply identified with that of the nineteenth century,
and can be determined only by a careful
analysis of the contemporary spirit in jurisprudence. It is my belief that the key
figure in contemporary jurisprudence is Mr.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and so
it is to him that I propose to give the lion's
share of my attention. Holmes has long
been in the Catholic "doghouse" as a charter member of the natural law "3 H Club"
of Hobbes, Holmes and Hitler, and I think
it is high time to attempt at least a partial
rehabilitation of his reputation among Catholics. My intention is to explore the
Holmesian legacy in jurisprudence both in
itself and in relation to natural law theory.
Holmes' most famous jurisprudential
work is a paper called The Path of the
Law, which he delivered as an address at
the dedication of a new law building at
Boston University in 1897. His starting
point in the paper is an attempt to define
the business of the lawyer, and his view
is that "the object of [the] study [of law]
• ..is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts." '2 Now the

phrase "the incidence of the public force"
sounds like an echo of Austin, and Holmes
was indeed a disciple of Austin up to a
point. But there are distinctly non-Austinian elements in this preliminary statement about the law, viz., his stress on the
work of the courts rather than on that of
the legislature and more especially his interest in prediction.
Continuing his initial stress on predic2 HOLMES,

(1920).
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tion, Holmes goes on to lay down some
first principles for more accurate prediction:
The first thing for a business-like understanding of the matter is to understand its
[law's] limits, and therefore I think it desirable at once to point out and dispel a
confusion between morality and law ...
If you want to know the law and nothing
else, you must look at it as a bad man,
who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him
to predict, not as a good one, who finds
his reasons for conduct, whether inside the
law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions
3
of conscience.
In this passage we encounter Holmes' famous "bad man" theory of law; the bad
man does not care "two straws" 4 for morality, but wants to know merely what the
courts are likely in fact to do. Only the
bad man sees the law as it is, Holmes feels,
because he alone sees it with his native vision, not through the tinted glasses of morality. When the bad man asks the lawyer
what the law is, so that he can find out
how much he can get away with, he does
not want to be told what people will think
of his action, or even what the lawyer
thinks of it, but only what the law says,
merely what his legal rights are. Unfortunately, Holmes thinks, there has been so
extensive an intrusion of morals into law,
as, for example, in the concepts of rights,
duties, malice, intent, and negligence, that
it is very difficult for the lawyer to predict
accurately for the benefit of the bad man.
"The law is full of phraseology drawn
from morals," he comments, "and by the
mere force of language continually invites
us to pass from one domain to the other
without perceiving it, as we are sure to do
unless we have the boundary constantly
8Id.at 169-71.
4 Id. at 173.

before our minds." 5

If this were the whole of Holmes, there
would be no point in attempting the rehabilitation of his reputation that I spoke of
earlier. But after dealing with what he considers the fallacy of confounding morality
with law, he proceeds to consider a second
fallacy, that of logical form, which is "the
notion that the only force at work in the
development of the law is logic." 6 Let us

listen to what he has to say about this fallacy:
The danger of which I speak is ... the no-

tion that a given system [of law], ours, for
instance, can be worked out like mathematics from some general axioms of conduct.
This is the natural error of the schools, but
it is not confined to them. I once heard a
very eminent judge say that he never let a
decision go until he was absolutely sure
that it was right. So judicial dissent often
is blamed, as if it meant simply that one
side or the other were not doing their sums
right, and, if they would take more trouble,
agreement inevitably would come.
This mode of thinking is entirely natural.
The training of lawyers is a training in
logic. The processes of analogy, discrimination, and deduction are those in which
they are most at home. The language of
judicial decision is mainly the language of
logic. And the logical method and form
flatter that longing for certainty and for
repose which is in every human mind. But
certainty generally is illusion, and repose
is not the destiny of man. Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative
worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the
very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. 7

In order to understand the almost revolutionary novelty of these words in 1897
we must advert to the fact that the tradiat 171.
6 Id.at 180.
7 ld. at 180-81.
5Id.
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tional theory of the common law, as laid
down by such masters as Coke and Blackstone, was that the judge did not make the
law but merely found it. In this view
there was nothing creative about the judicial role, for the judge has merely to look
in the opinions of his predecessors for principles from which to deduce the proper rule
for the case at hand. It was recognized
that sometimes no precedents directly in
point could be found, and in this event
the judge was expected to chart new lands,
in the sense that he might extend the old
principles by analogy. But he was at most
a judicial Christopher Columbus, discovering what was already existent, though previously unknown. He was never a Thomas
Edison, bringing into being something
which had not hitherto been. The judge
was, in sum, a logical automaton who
needed to know merely how to deduce conclusions from premises.
Holmes was neither the first nor the
only jurisprudent to take issue with the
old view, but it is worth remarking that it
was not until the first decade of the twentieth century that Roscoe Pound entered the
fray against the traditionalists, and that
Holmes' lecture was delivered two years
before Frangois G6ny published his Mthode d'interpritation et sources en droit
privi in 1899 and brought a similar viewpoint to bear on the French civil law.
Moreover, along with Pound, Holmes was
more responsible than anyone else for the
propagation in the common-law world of
the new theory that law is not an end in itself but merely a means to social ends.
Indeed Holmes had already written in his
book, The Common Law, published in
1.881:
The life of the law has not been logic: it
has been experience. The felt necessities of
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the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow men,
have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which
men should be governed."
It was, however, his formulation of the
same theme in his 1897 speech which was
to have the profoundest effect on later jurisprudents. The judge, he contends, is not
a mere calculator adding up sums; the real
question about the judge's work is not
whether his reasoning is correct but rather
where he got his premises. A conclusion
follows inevitably from premises, but the
premises are chosen, consciously or unconsciously, by the judge, and it is at this crucial stage of the judicial process that the
judge has the duty of "weighing considerations of social advantage." 9 The judge can
bury his head in the sand like an ostrich
and refuse to acknowledge that this is what
he does, but he cannot change the fact.
"The duty is inevitable," says Holmes, "and
the result of. the often proclaimed judicial
aversion to deal with such considerations
[of social advantage] is simply to leave
the very ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often unconscious."1o
Judicial Lawmaking
To see the truth about Holmes' contention as to the inevitability of judicial lawmaking, let us take two examples of the
judge's work, one from the area of statutory interpretation, the other from that
of common-law interpretation. Problems
in the area of statutory interpretation arise
not so much where there is some evidence
of legislative intention as where there is
8 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).

9 HOLMES, op. cit. supra note 2,
10

Ibid.

at 184.
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no such evidence because the point at issue
had never occurred to the legislative body.
Suppose, for example, a municipal licensing by-law which requires that all cabs
which operate within the municipality be
licensed by the municipal authorities, and
the by-law defines a cab as "any motor or
other vehicle used for hire for the conveyance of persons within the city." In its general range of -application such a law would
raise no problems, but the question might
very well arise for judicial solution whether
an ambulance came within the definition of
cab as set forth in the law and was thus
required to be licensed. Now is the outcome
a foregone conclusion or is it rather something about which right-minded men might
disagree? The answer may perhaps be
suggested by a statement of the fact that
the Ontario Court of Appeal recently split
2-1 on just such a question." Is not the
judge's decision in a case of this kind based
on what he thinks such a licensing statute
ought to include?
Now let us take an example from the
common law. Suppose a beneficiary under
a will murders the testator so that his family can have the benefit of the legacy
sooner, and an action is brought by the
other beneficiaries to ensure that the murderer and his family should not be allowed
to inherit his share of the estate. Here
the judge is confronted with a conflict
between the principle of the law of wills
that a beneficiary under a will is entitled to
his legacy after the death of the testator
and the principle of equity that no man
12
should profit from his own wrongdoing.
11

Re Regina v. Emslie, [1959] Ont. Weekly

N. 279. The view of the majority on this point
is expressed only by implication.

12 This is, of course, the famous case of Riggs
v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889).

What is the judge to do? The result is in
no sense predetermined by the principles of
law, and he must make a choice one way
or the other. The choice is not, surely, to
be made by the tossing of dice; if it is to
be judicial, it must be a reasoned and reasonable choice, not an arbitrary one. The
judge must, then, decide the issue on the
basis of some ought.
Holmes himself does not put it quite this
way. He speaks of the judge's duty of
"weighing considerations of social advantage," and of his judgment "as to the relative worth and importance of competing
legislative grounds," but these words are
linguistically and logically inseparable from
an acknowledgment of recourse to morals.
Indeed, if one rejects the slot-machine notion of the judicial function, the only acceptable alternative is a theory of the con,
junction of the is and the ought, of law and
morality. Holmes clearly accepts this alternative, but tacitly rather than expressly.
Since in the second part of his paper he
thus in effect acknowledges the indissoluble bonds which link morals to law through
the necessity of judicial recourse to the
realm of the ought, his thesis in the first
part of the paper becomes impossible to
maintain, for if the judge must find his ultimate answers in the moral realm, how
can morals be kept out of the law? The
"Bad Man" may have no morals of his own,
but he can hardly avoid caring about the
morals of others, particularly those of the
judge and jury who might try him if he is
caught in an act which teeters on the borderline of legality. The lawyer whose business it is to predict for the benefit of his
"Bad Man" client will have to give his answer in the context of community morals.
The "Bad Man" wants to know "the law
and nothing else," but this is impossible,
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because paradoxically, knowledge of the
"law" alone is not real knowledge of the
law. If he knows only the "law," he does
not know what may happen to him. His
anti-moral bias is in effect a pair of blinkers, and until he takes it off, he cannot get
a complete view of the world as it is.
The Legal Realists
This inner conflict in his thought was
never explained by Holmes himself, but
the key to the solution was subsequently
provided by the American Legal Realists.
The Realists acknowledged Holmes as
their spiritual father and took as their starting point his denunciation of the fallacy
of logical form in the second part of his
essay. The most famous of the Realists
was Karl Llewellyn, who introduced into
jurisprudence the notion of the merely temporary divorce of is and ought for purposes
of study. He explained this temporary divorce as follows:
By this I mean that whereas value judgments must always be appealed to in order
to set objectives for inquiry, yet during the
inquiry itself into what Is, the observation,
the description, and the establishment of
relations between the things described are
to remain as largely as possible uncontaminated by the desires of the observer or by
what he wishes might be or thinks ought
(ethically) to be. More particularly, this
involves during the study of what courts
are doing the effort to disregard the question what they ought to do. Such divorce of
Is and Ought is, of course, not conceived
as permanent. . . . [R]ealists believe that
experience shows the intrusion of Oughtspectacles during the i ivestigation of the
facts to make it very difficult to see what is.
being done. 13
13Llewellyn, Some Realism about RealismResponding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REv.
1222, 1236 (1931); Jones, Law and Morality
in the Perspective of Legal Realism, 61 COLUM.

L. REV. 799, 808 n.32 (1961) observes that "the

Now this is obviously quite a different kettie of fish from any doctrine of the separation of law and morals. It is not a divorce, but rather a separate vacation to
enable the parties to come together again
refreshed and clear-sighted. Nor is such a
view entirely foreign to the mind of Holmes
himself. If we look back again at The Path
ol the Law, we find him saying there:
When I emphasize the difference between
law and morals I do so with reference to a
single end, that of learning and understanding the law. For that purpose you must
definitely master its specific marks, and it
is for that I ask you for the moment to
imagine yourselves indifferent to other and
14
greater things.
This point of Holmes' gets pushed into the
background (apparently even in his own
mind) by his subsequent attack on the intrusion of morals into law, and we shall
never know if he would have endorsed
Llewellyn's view, but at any rate we can
see that Holmes can be interpreted benignly and that his Realist disciples have
chosen the better part.
However, though recognizing that the
separation of law and morals is only temporary and that there is ultimately a conjunction of the two, the Realists have by
and large been much more concerned with
the task of description of legal rules and
processes than with their relation to morals.
We do, of course, find statements such as
these of Felix Cohen: "the problem of the
judge is not whether a legal rule or concept actually exists but whether it ought
analytical separation that Llewellyn chiefly
wished to preserve was less that between the

doctrinal Is of analytical jurisprudence and the
ethical Ought than it was that between the Is of
law in action (what courts are doing in fact) and
the normative Ought of the law in the books."
14 HOLMES, op. cit. supra note 2, at 170.
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to exist." 1 And again: "The functional
approach permits ethics to come out of
hiding."' 6 However, neither Cohen nor any
other Realist in the heyday of Realism followed such words with further analysis and
development of the law-morals problem.
But the last two or three years have witnessed a new Realist interest in the problem. In a perceptive study last year Professor Harry Jones of Columbia University expressed the view that "The ethical
theory to be drawn from legal realism is...
that the moral dimension of law is to be
sought not in rules and principles, or the
higher law appraisal of rules and principles, but in the process of responsible decision. . . . "7 In his view the best place to
see the interplay of law and conscience is
in the decisional process, and his reading
of Tillich and Buber convinced him that
there was theological support for studying
justice in the concrete rather than in the
abstract. The key words in the Jones
analysis are choice, decision, and responsibility: the jurist must have the freedom
to choose between alternatives, he must
make his decision for the view he believes
to be the right one, with courage, integrity,
and the assumption of full personal moral
responsibility for his decision. Thus the
judge is responsible for his judgments and
for his exercise of the duty of sentencing,
the lawyer is responsible for his acceptance
of clients and cases, and the prosecuting
attorney is responsible for his decisions as
to which cases to lay charges in and what
charges to lay. Professor Jones concludes
his study with a situating of Legal Realism
in relation to natural law theory:
15 Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809,

841 (1935).
16 Id. at 847.
17 Jones, supra note 13, at 801.

In its approach to the law-morality problem, legal realism is closer, in one important sense, to the natural law position than
to the position of conventional analytical
jurisprudence. If the realist analysis is
right, the day to day work of judges, law
officers, and practicing lawyers involves
processes far less orderly and far more intricate than the application of positive law
generalizations to fact-situations falling
more or less neatly within them. .

.

. The

choice between alternatives, the selection
of the path to be pursued, can not but be
influenced by the decision-maker's ought to
be Legal realism, with its emphasis on the
inevitability of choice and discretion in the
life of the law, casts its vote-though for
very different reasons-with the tradition
of natural law, and against Austin and the
positivists, on the old issue of the complete
analytical separateness of the law that is
from the law that ought to be.18

But although there is congruence between
Legal Realism and the natural law position,
the Realist position as here expressed
hardly goes far enough to satisfy the natural lawyer, who is concerned not only
that there should be "choice, decision, and
responsibility," on the part of the judge
but also with the substance of his decision.
It is all very well if the judge decides in a
free,, responsible, even courageous manner,
but to the natural lawyer it is also of some
significance what he decides; others will be
more affected by what he decides than by
how he reached his decision. Judicial sincerity and good intentions are not enough
to ensure justice. This Realist answer to
the problem of law and morals is just not
extensive enough for the natural lawyer.
However, since many (if not most) of the
Realists are at the same time adherents
of the sociological school, of which Roscoe
Pound is the chief protagonist, it may still
be possible to find a more complete answer
18 Jones, supra note 13, at 808.

8
within a Realist context.
The Sociological View
Pound has hammered away again and
again at the theme that law is a means, not
an end-a means to the achievement of
general social goals. His view of society
is that it endeavors so to order the activities of men as to enable them to satisfy as
many of their interests as possible with the
least friction and waste, to bring about a
maximum of happiness, satisfying the wants
of each so far as this is compatible with
satisfying the wants of all. With this in
mind he has compiled an inventory of the
interests which press for recognition in society, but it is strictly a neutral inventory,
with no attempt to arrange the interests
presented in a hierarchy of value. Actually what Pound intends is that jurists
should accept the hierarchy of values of
the society in which they live. A great
judge, Mr. Justice Cardozo, who was an
adherent of the sociological view, wrote
that the judge is under a duty "to conform
to the accepted standards of the community,
the mores of the times."19

But how is the judge to know what the
community moral standards are? The view
of Lord Denning, the greatest living common-law judge, is that the judge should
rely on his own moral sense as indicative
of the moral views of his age, but this would
not satisfy the sociologists.

20

Logically it

would seem that they should endorse the
idea of a poll of popular opinion every time
it is necessary for an issue to be decided,
for only in this way could there be any
W CARDOZO,

THE
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scientific basis for decision. But the sociologists are not so blindly devoted to
their method as not to recognize the impracticability of a "Gallup-poll" approach
to judicial decision, and so in practice their
view is that the judge should guess what a
poll would reveal as to popular moral attitudes and make this the determining, factor
in his judicial work. At least this is the
view of Judge Hand.21 Cardozo's view was
rather that only the views of the 61ite should
be taken into account: "It is the customary
morality of right-minded men and women
which he [the judge] is to enforce by his
decree."2 2 In sum, the sociologists have

been unable to carry the science of sociology into the law and have had to settle
for a rule of thumb approximation of what
they think a scientific social survey would
discover. What the sociological school does
insist on is that to the extent he can ascertain what the mores of the people are, the
judge is bound to follow them. In practice
this would admittedly often result in the
judge's equation of the community's moral
sense with his own, but if the judge did recognize that his own view was not that of
society at large, he would be obliged to
forego the adoption of his own view and to
make into law the generally accepted view.
The basic position of the sociological
school, viz., that law is a means to social
ends and that the social ends are those
which are valued by a society at any particular time, is accepted, I believe, by the
Legal Realists almost without exception,
and certainly is adopted by their leader,
Mr. Justice Holmes. Thus in analyzing the
position of the sociological school, we have

JUDICIAL

PROCESS 108 (New ed. 1961).
20 For a discussion of Lord Denning's views,
see DOWRICK, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO THE ENG-

LISH COMMON LAWYERS 92 (1961).

21 Johnson v. United States, 186 F.2d 588,
590"(1951).
22 CARDOZO, op. cit. supra note 19, at 106.
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never really left the Realists, and may now
return to them with a better understanding
of their general position: they accept the
conjunction of law and morals, but the
morality to which they subject law is that
of the community.
The Natural Law Theory

Now what is to be the attitude of the
Catholic jurisprudent, who after all by
reason of his faith-and also by reason
of his acceptance of Thomistic philosophy,
if he does accept it-is committed to an
objective view of morals, in face of sociological realism? Well, first of all, I see no
incompatibility between his theological and
philosophical commitment and realism qua
realism. There has for too long been an unholy alliance between natural law theory
and the old Blackstonian theory of pre-existing rules of law which judges found but
did not make. Such an alliance could have
even a specious claim to our allegiance only
by exaggerating the rational, derived element of human positive law at the expense
of the volitional, legislative element, and
such an exaggeration is a gross distortion
of natural law theory. As I have written
elsewhere, "The more basic judge-made
rules and many constitutional and equitable
norms are . . . deduced, but by far the

greater number of explicit legal rules are...
not logically necessary. ' '2 3 However, mis-

conceptions of natural law by natural lawyers have led to an unwarranted and unjustifiable hostility between Realism and natural law theory which has proved distressing to the more perceptive Realists. Professor Jones writes:
One might have thought, thirty years
ago, that jurisprudents of the natural law
23 MacGuigan, Positive Law and the Moral
Law, 2 CURRENT LAW AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 89,

101 (1961).

tradition would not be entirely unsympathetic with the realist thesis that there is
more to legal decision-making than the orderly application of positive law generalizations. . . . In legal realism, as in natural
law theory, critical intelligence is brought
to bear on the positive law; neither approach is content with formal analysis of
positive law concepts, and both are concerned more with justice in human affairs
than with the inner doctrinal consistency
of the positive legal order. What happened,
however, is that an uncompromising attack
was launched from the natural law camp
on
on the legal realists, and particularly
24
their hero figure, Justice Holmes.
The past cannot now be undone, but it is
not too late for natural lawyers to make
amends for their past aversion to Realism.
Indeed the process of atonement has already begun. In an article published two
years ago Dean O'Meara of Notre Dame
Law School argued not only that natural
law theory was compatible with Legal
Realism but even that the natural law position is unsupportable except on a Realist
hypothesis of judicial creativity:
[W]hat role is there for natural law to play?
What contribution can it make? Comparatively little, so far as I can see, if law be
no more than an aggregation of already
existing rules. But law must be regarded
as a good deal more than that. It seems
to me convenient and useful to think of
law as a living process for the just resolution of never-ending human controversies.
If law is regarded in this light, as a process
of decision . . . the way is cleared for a
positive contribution by natural law....
This, of course, presupposes that the
judge is not an automaton proceeding
mechanically according to predetermined

rules.

.. .. 15

[T]he sharp distinction, commonly drawn,
between the law-that-is and the law-that24 Jones, supra note

13, at 801-02.

25 O'Meara, Natural Law and Everyday Law,

5 NATURAL L. F. 83, 84-85 (1960).

8
ought-to-be is unrealistic, for the simple
reason that the so-called law-that-is in important part is a myth .... 26
There can be no separation between the
is and the ought because the is is largely
a fiction to describe something that is really
in flux, or perhaps more accurately, because the is is constituted by the ought,
since the ought determines what it will be.
I believe that the future course of natural law theory lies in the direction taken
by Dean O'Meara, in company with the
Legal Realists, under the banner of the
much-reviled Holmes. But is it possible
for us to take such a direction without compromising our principles in the face of the
concomitant theory of sociologism? I think
that it is possible for two reasons. First,
I see no reason for us to take absolutist,
black-and-white positions towards alien
movements. I think that both we and the
devotees of these movements possess sufficient intellectual subtlety to be able to
distinguish the points in which we agree
from those in which we disagree. Second,
there is such a large area of agreement in
the practical order between natural lawyers
and sociologists that the likelihood of concrete disagreement in basic matters is small.
The rationalist tradition in ethics stemming from Aristotle and the theologically
inspired ethics of the Christian churches
have so thoroughly dominated both the
past and the present of our Western civilization that we find general agreement in
our society on moral conclusions even
where the philosophical justification of
the conclusions is quite different. For instance, Catholics and Protestants disagree
on the morality of birth control, but the
better Catholic opinion agrees with Protestant opinion that this is not in any case
26

Id. at 90.
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an appropriate area for legislation by the
state. Disagreement on moral issues is still
by and large in marginal areas. Of course,
this may change; perhaps it is even now
changihg, but there is no possibility of a
major conflict over social ends in the foreseeable future, except from the prudential
viewpoint-and I venture to say that there
is greater prudential disagreement between
the Catholic liberal and the Catholic conservative than between the Catholic liberal
and the sociologist.
But to say that the future direction of
natural law theory is clear-if it is to have
any future-is not to say that the road is
already surveyed, graded, paved, and whitemarked. Indeed there is a great deal of
swampy ground between the contemporary
forward-looking natural lawyer and the
destination he dimly discerns in the distance. The problem for the natural lawyer
is that he must be both legal and philosophical at the same time, that he must do justice to both areas together. Dean O'Meara
adopts the approach of the Legal Realists
at the expense of philosophical natural law
theory. I have in mind his general view
of natural law theory as a non-reason theory and particularly his statement, "I do
not envisage natural law as the arbiter of
legal validity. 'Law is law, whether it be
good or bad.' "27 Now I am willing to concede that the traditional natural law view
that civil law is judged and measured by
the moral law may have to be re-examined
as part of our contribution to "legal ecumenicism," but I am not willing to grant
that it can be abandoned in a single sentence (which is all that Dean O'Meara
devotes to it) without a lengthy and soulsearching enquiry. And I may add that I
do not see how the moral critique of bad
27

id. at 84.
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law could conceivably be totally abandoned by a natural law theory without an
abandonment of the whole natural law
philosophy. So much for fidelity to philosophical principles.
On the other hand, of equal importance
is fidelity to legal experience, to the genius
of the common law. Dean O'Meara is certainly right in chiding that "for the most
part, natural law stands aloof from the
urgent here-and-now with which lawyer
and judge necessarily are preoccupied; it
inhabits a world apart. ' 2 The autonomous
and unique claims of the legal order were
even more clearly stated by one of the
speakers at a conference of Italian Catholic lawyers in 1951:
[W]e are not theologians ...we are not
philosophers. We are lawyers, and this
means that we are addicted to a particular
science which has an object of its own: the
rule of positive law. Is there no way, no
20
method which we can call our own?
Consciously or not, the traditional answer
of the natural law thinker to this question
has been "No."
Part of the problem has, I think, been
the inability of the scholastically-trained
thinker to speak to the lawyer in terminology which he can understand. Catholic
theological and philosophical natural lawyers have not succeeded in carrying on a
dialogue, as opposed to a monologue, with
even the Catholic legal profession. But beyond this failing of communication, I believe that there has been even more profound failing on the part of the scholastic
28ld. at 83.
29 The speaker was Joseph Delos, O.P., and his
remarks are quoted in D'Entr~ves, The Case for
Natural Law Re-Examined, 1 NATURAL L. F. 5,

37-38 (1956).

natural lawyer, viz., a lack of respect for
the integrity and autonomy of the legal order, based on a lack of understanding of
it. A meaningful discussion of the natural
law for any lawyer, Catholic or otherwise,
cannot begin with a remote and abstract
principle from which a whole series of
other principles is deduced until finally
the divide between the scientific and the
prudential is crossed. It must begin rather
with the lawyer's reality, the only reality
which qua lawyer he knows, viz., cases and
statutes. It is at this level and I believe
at this level alone that a natural law theory
meaningful for the lawyer as well as for the
theologian and philosopher can be worked
out. Here is the real field of battle, where
the pointed spears of facts and the hard
surface of the concrete-if one may still
make such a primitive war metaphor in an
atomic age-await the ill-equipped and illtrained. The Scholastic natural lawyer has
not yet earned his spurs in this fray and
until he demonstrates his command in the
field, he cannot expect to have his doctrine
accepted.
Here, then, is the natural lawyer's problem. I think that, contrary to the prevailing
Catholic opinion, there is no better place
for the natural lawyer to begin than with
Mr. Justice Holmes. But if Holmes' terminal point did not satisfy the later Legal
Realists, still less can it prove satisfactory
for the natural lawyer. Indeed no clear destination is in sight for the natural lawyer
and the road ahead is merely a rough and
meandering cowpath. But perhaps if he
drinks deeply enough of the Holmesian
Realism, he will acquire the strength to
rise and walk for forty days and forty
nights into the uncertain future.
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